Being writtenSecurity awareness

Phishing and business email compromise

The attacks that pass SPF, DKIM and DMARC, and the habits that catch them anyway.

LevelFoundation
Material3 modules, 10 lessons
Reading time1 h 33 m
StatusBeing written — not open

This course is not available yet

It is being written. The outline below is what it will cover, and it is unlikely to change much. There is no enrolment and no date — when it is ready it will be on this page. Several of the lessons are built around tools on this site that already work, so you can practise the measurements today.

If you need this capability now rather than later, Advanced email security is the service that covers it, or talk to us.

Who it is for

Everyone who receives email at work, with a longer final module for the finance and payroll staff who are targeted specifically.

Foundation. No prior experience assumed. Written for people whose job is not IT.

No prerequisites. Nothing is assumed beyond using a computer at work.

What you will be able to do

  • Explain why a message can pass every authentication check and still be a fraud
  • Identify a lookalike domain and a display name that does not match the sending address
  • Describe the payment-change request pattern and the verification step that defeats it
  • Report a suspected message in a way that preserves the evidence

Outline

3 modules, 10 lessons, 1 h 33 m of material. The times are the sum of the lessons rather than a round figure.

01What authentication does and does not prove

SPF, DKIM and DMARC authenticate a domain. They say nothing about whether the sender is honest, and nothing at all about the name your mail client shows you.

The three checks, in one page8 m

What each one actually tests, without the acronym soup.

The attacker who passes all three10 m

Registering a domain you control and configuring it properly is cheap. Authentication then confirms you are who you say you are — which is the problem.

Reading a header block12 m

Finding the raw headers in your own mail client, and the three lines worth looking at.

02The four patterns

Almost everything that arrives is one of these wearing different clothes.

The lookalike domain9 m

One character, a different top-level domain, or a subdomain that reads like the real thing.

The display name that is an email address7 m

Most clients show only the name. A name can be any text at all, including somebody else’s address.

The reply-to redirect7 m

The message comes from the real domain; the reply does not go back to it.

The thread that was already running10 m

Reply-chain hijacking, where the attacker joins a genuine conversation from a compromised mailbox.

03For finance and payroll

The payment-change request is the single most expensive message an organisation receives, and it is the one most easily defeated by process.

How a payment-change fraud is built12 m

The research, the timing, the pressure, and why it usually arrives on a Friday.

The verification step that works10 m

Out-of-band confirmation on a number you already had — and why confirming by email is not confirmation.

When it has already happened8 m

The first hour, who to call, and what the bank can still do.

Format. Short written lessons with worked examples from real headers, and a practical exercise using this site’s own header analyser. Delivery mechanism is not built yet.

Would you rather we just did it?

This course exists because the work behind it is work we do. If you need the result rather than the skill, advanced email security is the service that covers it.